1. INTRODUCTION

Early November witnessed a dramatic change in the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. Beginning with the fall of Mazar-i-Sherif, and followed by the entry of Northern Alliance troops into Kabul on November 12, a large swath of Afghanistan has shifted from Taliban control to control by the Northern Alliance and/or other local groups/commanders. The Taliban have retreated from the north of the country, so the focus of the conflict has shifted toward increasingly isolated Taliban strongholds in the southeast of the country.

2. IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

This dramatic reversal of fortunes has profound implications for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the millions of Afghans who need it. In the medium- to long-term, it is very much to be hoped that this month's events will represent the beginning in a turnaround for the beleaguered people of Afghanistan, who have suffered enormously through 20-plus years of civil conflict and three years of severe drought. For this hope to be realized, the delivery of humanitarian assistance will need to be quickly and dramatically scaled up to allow millions of vulnerable civilians to make it through the winter. In addition, there will need to be tangible progress toward the establishment of a new, broad-based government that enjoys broad legitimacy throughout Afghanistan.

While there are grounds for optimism longer-term, the recent change of the situation on the ground inside Afghanistan has had, at least temporarily, a negative impact on the international community's efforts to deliver large quantities of food to vulnerable people. The negative short-term implications of recent events are:

• Since November 13, the day following the entry of Northern Alliance forces into Kabul, food dispatches into Afghanistan have dropped off sharply. During a three-week period from October 23 through November 12, WFP (World Food Programme) was able to dispatch an average of more than 2,100MT (metric tons) per day of food into Afghanistan. (Prior to October 23, deliveries were at a much lower level, particularly following the beginning of Coalition bombing on October 7.) If sustained, this rate of delivery would allow WFP to meet or exceed its target of 52,000MT per month. Beginning on November 13, deliveries again fell off sharply as a result of the shifting military control in much of the country. In the first two days after the fall of Kabul, a total of only slightly more than 1,100MT of food was shipped into Afghanistan, all of it via Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. No food moved across the borders of Pakistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan. Understandably, private truckers were not willing to take the risk, given fighting around Kandahar, Mazar, Herat, and other key cities, as well as the high degree of tension and uncertainty throughout the country.
• Of greatest concern is the fact that many parts of the country have experienced, at least temporarily, increased insecurity during this transition period. In Mazar-i-Sherif, there have been reports of conflict between competing factions, revenge killings, and the looting of UN facilities. In Kabul, there were reports of more limited revenge killings, and the warehouses of both CARE and ICRC were looted. A group of some 1,000 Hazara fighters have also begun moving from their stronghold in Bamiyan to the outskirts of Kabul. Elsewhere in the country, tensions are high in many areas, as competing factions jockey for position in the wake of the Taliban's withdrawal. In Jalalabad, three competing factions were eventually able to reach agreement on forming a local shura (council) and naming a new Governor. In CARE's operational areas of Wardak and Ghazni, rival shuras have been set up by competing Pashtun and Hazara groups. As a result of all this military activity and tension between rival groups, commercial traffic has been very limited. In general, the situation is tense and the Afghan people fear for their safety and a possible reversion to the very insecure pre-Taliban years (1992-94).
3. PRIORITIES IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT

The present situation in Afghanistan gives rise to three priority concerns: 1) the re-establishment of a secure environment, particularly in Kabul and other major cities; 2) the rapid resumption of large-scale aid deliveries to affected people throughout Afghanistan; and 3) the acceleration of the political process to form a new, broad-based government. These priorities are consistent with UN Security Council resolution 1378, adopted on November 14, 2001.

Security—Maintaining a reasonable level of security inside Afghanistan is a necessary pre-condition to a successful transition to a more stable future for the Afghan people. The Afghan people remember all too well the years preceding the rise of the Taliban, when the government failed to bring peace and Kabul was destroyed. UN Security Council resolution 1378 contains two provisions related to security. The first calls on "all Afghan forces to refrain from reprisal, to adhere strictly to their obligations under human rights and international humanitarian law, and to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, as well as personnel of humanitarian organizations." The second encouraged Member States to "support efforts to ensure the safety and security of areas of Afghanistan no longer under Taliban control, and in particular for Kabul as the capital for all the Afghan people, and especially to protect civilians, transitional authorities, United Nations and associated personnel, as well as personnel of humanitarian organizations."

CARE's advocacy messages reinforce both of these points:

1) All Afghan forces, including those of the Northern Alliance, should be called upon to exercise restraint and avoid repetition of previous abuses. They should also be called upon to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and prevent any further looting of UN and NGO warehouses and offices. From past experience, both the Afghan people and aid agencies have reason to believe that additional steps will be required to guarantee a secure environment.

2) It is precisely because of recent Afghan history that Member States have been called upon by the UN to provide additional security. While the details of the extent and role of international military forces are still unknown, this effort appears to be getting underway quickly. A small contingent of British forces has already established itself at Bagram airport, north of Kabul. Some reports have suggested that 2,000 or more British troops might be committed to Kabul to ensure the city's security. French forces are reported to be en route to Mazar-i-Sherif, and NATO is drafting a plan to fly aid to neighboring countries. Other countries that have been mentioned as possible participants in this effort include Canada, Turkey, Jordan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Australia. It has already been reported that the Northern Alliance is displeased with the initial deployment of British troops in Bagram, indicating that they were not consulted and that such an international presence is unnecessary, so it still remain to be seen how the different armed factions will respond to the foreign military presence.

One of the primary rationales being put forward for the introduction of foreign troops is to ensure and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This means that the UN and NGOs, including CARE, can expect to have substantial interaction with the military over the months to come. There will thus be a need for CARE to further develop its guidelines for interaction with the military in the current Afghan context and to develop appropriate advocacy messages. Among the messages that CARE might adopt are:

1. Overall strategy and management for the humanitarian effort should remain firmly under civilian control, and any military participation should be in a support, rather than leadership role. Constant attention should be given to maintaining the distinction between the humanitarian and military spheres, as further blurring of this distinction could have negative long-term consequences for the integrity of humanitarian action. To minimize the blurring of this distinction, it is preferable that any follow-on international military presence for peace-keeping and/or humanitarian purposes be separate and distinct from the current U.S.-led military coalition. Any U.S. or British forces used for such purposes should be replaced at the earliest possible time by forces from other countries not directly engaged in the current military campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban;
2. The military's on-going role in Afghanistan should focus on those activities for which they have a comparative advantage in expertise and capacity, leaving the actual delivery of humanitarian assistance to local and international organizations that have long experience and established networks in Afghanistan. Some specific roles that the military could be called on to play include: i) providing a reassuring international presence for the local population in Kabul and other cities as required; ii) monitoring and training local security forces; iii) de-mining and disposal of unexploded ordnance; iv) repairing runways and roads to facilitate aid delivery; and v) provision of aircraft and crews to airlift aid to neighboring countries and, when necessary and requested, inside Afghanistan and to airdrop supplies into areas where no other means of access is possible during winter months.

Humanitarian Access—Getting aid to the millions of Afghans in urgent need will remain CARE's primary focus. With winter already arriving and existing food supplies dwindling, this need is more urgent than ever. While some have publicly claimed that enough food is getting into Afghanistan, this is not the case. It is true that WFP was able to rapidly gear up its efforts during the three-week period from late October to early November. With those deliveries again severely disrupted following the fall of Kabul, it is absolutely imperative that large-scale movements of food resume as quickly as possible. WFP has indicated that deliveries of in excess of 50,000 MT/month are required over the next four months. In addition to sustained deliveries of food into Afghanistan, getting it to final distribution points will be another major challenge. This will primarily be the responsibility of local and international NGOs. For areas not accessible by road, delivery by air will be required, and such air operations should be under UN/WFP control.

To summarize, CARE believes the logistical challenges of the current Afghan humanitarian crisis are far from being solved. Enough food may be in neighboring countries or on its way, but too little of this has yet to reach the affected populations inside Afghanistan. Until large quantities of food are delivered on a sustained basis into Afghanistan, it is premature to declare victory. We should continue to encourage and support WFP in its efforts to dispatch food into Afghanistan. NGOs, for their part, have an equally daunting challenge to re-establish an adequate presence on the ground to ensure delivery to the final distribution points. Winter is already arriving, and access to some areas will become increasingly difficult in the weeks to come.

Political Process—While CARE may choose to not say much about the formation of a new national government, this process is clearly central to the future stability of Afghanistan. We thus endorse and support the role of the United Nations in facilitating a process by which Afghans themselves decide on their future government. UN Security Council Resolution 1378 speaks to this issue and endorses the approach outlined by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Lakhdar Brahimi. Resolution 1378 expresses strong support for the "efforts of the Afghan people to establish a new and transitional administration leading to the formation of a government, both of which should be broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative." This new government is called upon to respect the "human rights of all Afghan people, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion," "respect Afghanistan's international obligations, including by cooperating fully in international efforts to combat terrorism and illicit drug trafficking," and "facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance and the orderly return of refugees and internally displaced persons, when the situation permits." This is an ambitious agenda that, under the best of circumstances will take many months, or even years, to fulfill. It is, however, vital to the country's future. To date, the political process has lagged behind the military campaign, but it now shows signs of moving to the forefront of the international community's efforts. The fact that Kabul came under Northern Alliance control before a new, transitional government was in place renders the political process even more urgent.

4. CONCLUSION

The events of recent weeks in Afghanistan have been dramatic. While the outcome is still not conclusive, there is hope. Much, however, remains to be done, and the current situation is tense. The humanitarian situation also remains dire, and it is imperative that the relief effort be ramped up very quickly. During the present crisis period, the focus of CARE's advocacy should remain on such immediate priorities as security, humanitarian access, and the establishment of a new government.

Longer-term, there are other important issues that should be addressed by humanitarian agencies, including the need for a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. One critical aspect of the country's future which has already surfaced as a priority is that of women's rights. In light of the extreme policies of the Taliban, such a focus is entirely appropriate. The greatest challenge may be to strike the right balance between the views of the western countries on gender matters and the more conservative norms of traditional Afghan society.

Humanitarian agencies such as CARE are well- positioned to make a significant contribution in the reconstruction phase, given their experience in such critical areas as education (including girls' education), health, water, and food security.

CARE Policy and Advocacy Unit

November 19, 2001